

Series Editor
Jean-Paul Bourrières

Cybersecurity of Industrial Systems

Jean-Marie Flaus

Color section




Figure 1.1. *Information system*




Figure 1.2. *Industrial information system*




Figure 1.3. *IIoT information system*




Figure 1.4. *The minimal functions of a SCADA*




Figure 1.10. *Safety instrumented system (SIS)*




Figure 1.11. *The position of the SIS in terms of protection level*



Figure 1.12. HMI on PC



Figure 1.13. Dedicated unit for HMI




Figure 1.14. IoT platform




Figure 2.1. Typical ICS architecture




Figure 2.2. (a) Purdue and (b) ISA85 models




Figure 2.3. IEC 62443 model




Figure 2.4. Converged Plantwide Ethernet (CPwE) model




Figure 2.5. Model of the previous installation according to the CIM architecture




Figure 2.6. IIoT architecture







Figure 2.7. *Classic network topologies*




Figure 2.8. *Mixed network topology (IIoT)*




Figure 2.9. *OSI models and TCP/IP stack*




Figure 2.10. *Different wireless communication solutions*




Figure 2.11. *IoT protocols and OSI model*




Figure 2.12. Data packages




Figure 2.17. Modbus frame




Figure 2.19. CAN frame




Figure 3.1. *Security needs of IS and ICS*




Figure 3.2. *The different layers of IT security*




Figure 3.3. *Swiss cheese adapted to IT security*




Figure 3.7. *Different types of impacts*




Figure 3.8. *Risk matrix or heat map*




Figure 3.10. *Defense in depth*




Figure 3.11. Continuous improvement PDCA and ISO 27001:2013




Figure 4.1. Vector of attack and vulnerability




Figure 4.2. *Primary and secondary attacks*




Figure 4.3. *DDoS attack by a botnet*




Figure 4.5. Attack by buffer overflow




Figure 4.7. MitM attack




Figure 4.9. *Sectors affected by attacks*




Figure 5.3. Attack surface of an ICS




Figure 5.6. Answer to CSET questions screen

Greenbone Security Assistant

Scan Management Asset Management SecInfo Management Configuration Extras Administration Help

Report: Results 1 - 100 of 130 (total: 262)

Filter: sort-reverse=severity result_hosts_only=1 min_cvss_base= min_qo

Vulnerability	Severity	QoD	Host	Location	Actions
ProFTPD Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities	10.0 (critical)	80%	192.168.111.130	218tcp	
Possible Backdoor Ingreslock	10.0 (critical)	99%	192.168.111.130	1524tcp	
ProFTPD Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities	10.0 (critical)	80%	192.168.111.130	2121tcp	
X Server	10.0 (critical)	80%	192.168.111.130	6000tcp	
distcc Remote Code Execution Vulnerability	9.3 (high)	89%	192.168.111.130	3632tcp	
SSH Brute Force Logins with default Credentials	9.0 (high)	85%	192.168.111.130	22tcp	
MySQL weak password	8.8 (high)	95%	192.168.111.130	3306tcp	
PostgreSQL weak password	9.0 (high)	99%	192.168.111.130	5432tcp	
PostgreSQL Multiple Security Vulnerabilities	8.5 (high)	80%	192.168.111.130	5432tcp	
vsftpd Compromised Source Packages Backdoor Vulnerability	7.5 (high)	99%	192.168.111.130	218tcp	
ProFTPD Server SQL Injection Vulnerability	7.5 (high)	75%	192.168.111.130	218tcp	
phpMyAdmin Code Injection and XSS Vulnerability	7.5 (high)	75%	192.168.111.130	808tcp	
phpMyAdmin BLOB Streaming Multiple Input Validation Vulnerabilities	7.5 (high)	75%	192.168.111.130	808tcp	
phpMyAdmin Configuration File PHP Code Injection Vulnerability	7.5 (high)	75%	192.168.111.130	808tcp	
PHP-CGI-based setups vulnerability when parsing query string parameters from php files.	7.5 (high)	95%	192.168.111.130	808tcp	
phpinfo() output accessible	7.5 (high)	80%	192.168.111.130	808tcp	
ProFTPD Server SQL Injection Vulnerability	7.5 (high)	75%	192.168.111.130	2121tcp	

Figure 5.7. Example of OpenVAS analysis




Figure 6.4. *Structure of the NIST framework*

IDENTIFY	ID.AM	Asset Management
	ID.BE	Business Environment
	ID.GV	Governance
	ID.RA	Risk Assessment
	ID.RM	Risk Management Strategy
	ID.SC	Supply Chain Risk Management
PROTECT (PR)	PR.AC	Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control
	PR.AT	Awareness and Training
	PR.DS	Data Security
	PR.IP	Information Protection Processes and Procedures
	PR.MA	Maintenance
DETECT (DE)	PR.PT	Protective Technology
	DE.AE	Anomalies and Events
	DE.CM	Security Continuous Monitoring
RESPOND (RS)	DE.DP	Detection Processes
	RS.RP	Response Planning
	RS.CO	Communications
	RS.AN	Analysis
	RS.MI	Mitigation
RECOVER (RC)	RS.IM	Improvements
	RC.RP	Recovery Planning
	RC.IM	Improvements
	RC.CO	Communications

Figure 6.5. Structure of the NIST Framework




Figure 6.6. *Gradual approach*




Figure 6.8. *Matrix to determine exposure level and class*




Figure 7.4. Structure of the IEC 62443 (7/2018) standard




Figure 7.7. *Security levels*




Figure 7.9. Example of division into zones and conduits



Figure 7.10. Maturity levels




Figure 7.12. Component and system level documents




Figure 7.13. *Determination of SL-T from the risk matrix*

Tolerable Risk=4		
Risk	CRRF	SL-T
1	0,25	0
2	0,5	0
3	0,75	0
4	1	0
5	1,25	1
6	1,5	1
7	1,75	1
8	2	1
9	2,25	2
10	2,5	2
11	2,75	2
12	3	2
13	3,25	3
14	3,5	3
15	3,75	3

Tolerable Risk=4		
Risk	CRRF	SL-T
16	4	3
17	4,25	4
18	4,5	4
19	4,75	4
20	5	4
21	5,25	4
22	5,5	4
23	5,75	4
24	6	4
25	6,25	4

Figure 7.14. *Determination of SL-T with CRRF*




Figure 8.12. *Independent Protection Levels (IPL)*




Figure 8.13. IPL and risk management




Figure 9.4. Steps of the EBIOS method

		Likelihood			
		Minimal	Significant	High	Maximum
Severity	Critical				Critical P1
	Major	To be tackled if possible P3	High P2		
	Moderate				
	Insignificant	Tolerable			

Figure 9.5. Risk matrix

Core assets	Feared event	Security requirement	Impacts	Threat sources	L (likelihood)	S (severity)
Supervision	Tampering of measured data	3. Integrity	Supervision screens out of step with real values Uncontrolled production	Internal human source, with malicious intent and limited capabilities External human source, with malicious intent and limited capabilities	3. High	3. Significant

Figure 9.6. Example of an EBIOS analysis table




Figure 9.9. Classic risk matrix (top) and scope




Figure 10.1. Example of physical mapping




Figure 10.2. Example of logical mapping




Figure 10.3. Grassmarlin screenshot




Figure 10.4. Architecture with a DMZ




Figure 10.5. Example of division into zones and conduits




Figure 10.6. *Principle of a data diode*




Figure 10.7. *Example of an architecture with data diode, firewall and industrial firewall*




Figure 10.8. NIDS




Figure 10.9. HIDS




Figure 10.10. *Structure of an IDS*




Figure 10.11. *Structure of an industrial IDS*




Figure 10.12. SIEM screen




Figure 10.13. SoC with security element




Figure 11.1. *Structure of the NIST framework*




Figure 11.2. *Defense in depth*




Figure 11.3. *Different levels of countermeasures*




Figure 11.4. Steps in the ICS security process