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# Contents

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<b>Preface</b> . . . . .	ix
<b>Acknowledgments</b> . . . . .	xv
<b>Introduction</b> . . . . .	xvii
<b>Part 1. Pluralism between Ethics and Politics in the Context of Prevention</b> . . . . .	1
<b>Introduction to Part 1</b> . . . . .	3
<b>Chapter 1. Burdens of Judgment and Ethical Pluralism of Values</b> . . . . .	11
1.1. The “burdens of judgment” at the root of the “fact of reasonable pluralism” . . . . .	13
1.2. Burdens of judgment: a critique . . . . .	17
1.2.1. Burdens of judgment: a starting point, not an obstacle . . . . .	17
1.2.2. The variable geometry of pluralisms . . . . .	22
1.3. Ethical pluralism of values, from relativism to monism . . . . .	26
1.4. Relativisms and commitments . . . . .	32
1.4.1. Three types of relativism . . . . .	32
1.4.2. Commitments in response to values . . . . .	33
1.5. Opposing monism: conditionality, incompatibility and incommensurability of values. . . . .	36
1.6. Conclusion: decompartmentalizing conflicts of values. . . . .	38

<b>Chapter 2. Ethical Pluralism of Ethical Theories at the Heart of Evaluation</b> . . . . .	43
2.1. Ordinary morality, anti-theory and skepticism . . . . .	44
2.2. What is an ethical theory?. . . . .	47
2.3. Main ethical theories . . . . .	50
2.4. Pluralism in practical reasoning . . . . .	55
2.4.1. Formal practical reasoning. . . . .	56
2.4.2. Substantial practical reasoning. . . . .	58
2.5. Interactions between normative factors and foundational normative theories. . . . .	60
2.6. Conclusion: conflicts and deliberation in the context of ethical theories . . . . .	64
<b>Chapter 3. Deliberative Democracy Put to the Test of Ethical Pluralism.</b> . . . . .	71
3.1. Participatory exposure. . . . .	72
3.2. Rawls and Habermas: opposing views in support of deliberation . . . . .	74
3.2.1. Rawls: restricted ethics . . . . .	75
3.2.2. Habermas: reliance on undefined arguments . . . . .	77
3.3. Deliberating in a democracy . . . . .	80
3.4. Desperately seeking arguments. . . . .	85
3.5. Conclusion: pluralism of moral and political philosophers. . . . .	88
<b>Conclusion to Part 1: Mapping the “Should-be” of the Public Sphere.</b> . . . . .	95
<b>Part 2. Ethical and Political Pluralism in a Context of Precaution.</b> . . . . .	105
<b>Introduction to Part 2</b> . . . . .	107
<b>Chapter 4. Deciding on, and in, Uncertainty Using the Precautionary Meta-principle</b> . . . . .	113
4.1. Careless criticisms of the precautionary principle . . . . .	116
4.2. Precautionary principle: components and trigger factors. . . . .	122
4.3. To act, or not to act . . . . .	126
4.4. Clashing scenarios and “grammars” of the future. . . . .	129
4.5. Typology of political decisions in the context of uncertainty . . . . .	132
4.6. Conclusion: the deliberative as genre for uncertain futures . . . . .	135

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<b>Chapter 5. Between Sciences and Ethics: A New Quarrel of Faculties?</b> . . . . .	143
5.1. Scientists between attachment and independence. . . . .	144
5.2. Politics of nature. . . . .	152
5.3. The prominent role of values in paradigm changes. . . . .	160
5.4. Relationships between scientific facts, epistemic values and ethical values. . . . .	162
5.5. Conclusion: a <i>Republic of Letters</i> dealing with facts and values . . . . .	165
<b>Chapter 6. Co-argumentation in a Context of Disciplinary Pluralism</b> . . . . .	173
6.1. Epistemic pluralism and competitive positions . . . . .	177
6.2. Tensions and cooperation due to pluralism internal and external to disciplines . . . . .	180
6.3. Types of argumentation and dialogue . . . . .	184
6.4. Co-dependence between ethical argumentation and scientific investigation. . . . .	191
6.5. Confrontation of hypotheses . . . . .	194
6.6. Conclusion: structuring of inter- and intra-disciplinary pluralisms thanks to the precautionary meta-principle . . . . .	200
<b>Conclusion</b> . . . . .	207
<b>Bibliography</b> . . . . .	225
<b>Index</b> . . . . .	245